Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Xiong, Yan ; Jiang, Xu |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 73.2022, 2/3, p. 1-22
|
Subject: | CD&A disclosure | Compensation contract disclosure | Coordination failure | Managerial myopia | Market competition | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wettbewerb | Competition | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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