We examine how compensation of chief executive officer (CEO) and corporate governance practices affect earnings management behavior in an emerging economy, Pakistan. Using 1836 firm-year observations from 260 firms listed in KSE for period 2005 to 2012, we do not find that CEO compensation has...

The aim of this paper is to explain relationship between earning management, corporate governance and managerial optimism through the governance characteristics that are board of directors such as independence, duality and size and ownership structure such as managerial participation, block...

Using a hand-collected sample of Italian family and non-family-controlled firms, we investigate the moderating effect of family ownership on the relation between earnings management and CEO turnover. Consistent with agency theory, we find a positive and significant relation between earnings...

This study examines the effect of the exogenous increase in the presence of female directors on FTSE350 corporate boards in the UK, as mandated by the Davies Report (2011), on the association between earnings management and CEO incentive compensation. We use a hand-collected dataset of FTSE350...

Prior literature shows that choices regarding board composition are associated with earnings management. We add to this literature by examining the effects of the presence of a foreign board member on earnings management. Using a sample of 3,249 firm-year observations representing 586...

We examine earnings management around the annual general meeting (AGM) and assess the influence of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with prior research, we show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding AGMs regardless of the level of managerial entrenchment. We find...

This study examines changes in CEOs' incentive to manage their firms' earnings during their tenure as CEO. We show that earnings are more likely to be overstated in the early years than in the later years of CEOs' service, and that this association is weaker for firms with greater institutional...

Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The previous literature has...

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired...

The role of board secretaries is a unique institutional feature in China. Individuals in this senior executive role are responsible for coordinating information disclosure. We study the impact of board secretaries on management earnings forecasts and find that their legal expertise, accounting...