We analyze the dynamics of the Japanese board network from 2004 until 2013. We find that the network exhibits some clustering with visible firm conglomerates. Ties between firms are rather persistent, despite noticeable churning among directors. Ownership relations explain only a small fraction...

Using a sample of 104 companies that conducted initial public offering (IPO) on the Warsaw Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2016, we investigated the relationship between the accuracy and bias of the earnings forecast disclosed in the IPO prospectus and the firm corporate governance attributes....

Directors and supervisory board members (officers) are increasingly being held personally liable. Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance offers directors and supervisory board members ample protection against directors' and officers' liability. On the one hand, this has many advantages...

This paper examines the effectiveness and the independence board by using all firms listed on the main board of China from 2000 to 2009. I find significant inverse relationship between supervisory board size and firm performance. In addition, I find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic...

We model a corporate board evaluating a CEO of uncertain management ability. Each director receives a noisy private signal about CEO ability, after which directors discuss this ability and vote to retain or replace the CEO. Directors care about true CEO ability, since it affects their equity...

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the...

This study examines the implications of CEO power on the board structure of banks in the Ghanaian banking industry. Using a unique hand-collected dataset in respect of 21 commercial banks in Ghana for the 2009 – 2017 periods, the results show that CEO power underscores the absence or lack of...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms whose boards were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ independence requirements than in firms that were compliant. We document that 65% of the magnitude is driven by a single outlier. All our attempts to...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865...

In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking...