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This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that … activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less … oust underperforming CEOs, strengthen CEO incentives, and increase the use of RPE. CEO pay levels rise following activism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936387
This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega … CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972638
of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation … incentives vary across firms and over time, significantly influencing important board decisions and firm outcomes. When more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974592
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125083
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the owner's capacity to monitor delegated managers. We show how resultant misaligned managerial incentives can translate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046269
also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the … with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate …, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319438
In this paper, we show that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with a managerial incentive scheme. While both these instruments allow firms to “aggressively” participate in product market competition, we show that they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848382
This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent's talent when it consists of two components. The agent observes the first component of his talent as his private type, and reports it to a principal to perform a task which reveals the second component of his talent. Based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046363
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … ; managerial incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883