This paper investigates the impact of managerial compensation on the likelihood of covenant violations and reports that higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged...

We use CEO health shocks as a time-varying and physical managerial attribute that can change the degree of managerial effort. Using hand-collected data on CEO illnesses, deaths, and medical leaves to identify large health shocks, we find that firm value is considerably lower and firm volatility,...

General Motor's ability to exit bankruptcy through a public offering of its common stock (IPO) depended heavily on the sacrifices of active and retired members of the United Auto Workers (UAW). A review of the now public filings of GM related to the IPO indicate the significant concessions UAW...

Based on the evidence after the outbreak of SARS in 2003, which is caused by the same family of viruses as COVID-19, we show that due to the “probability weighting” phenomenon, i.e., decision makers tend to overweight the probability of extreme tail events, the epidemic experience induces...

While recent studies show that long vesting periods in managerial compensation increase corporate investments, it may reshape the shareholder-debtholder conflict as shareholders have to split the gains with creditors. We find that firms with longer CEO pay durations use more short-maturity...

We examine how CEO's inside-debt based compensation incentives (pension benefits and other deferred compensation) influence firm's debt maturity structure. We examine this relationship in the context of the hypothesis that CEO's inside-debt based incentives exposes managers to similar kind of...

This study investigates the effect of female chief executive officers (FCEOs) on investment efficiency. Our study suggests that CEO gender plays a significant role in efficient investment decisions by improving governance and disciplining the management. We document that FCEOs are associated...

Institutional investors pay considerable attention to the quality of a company's governance. Unfortunately, it is difficult for outside observers to reliably gauge governance quality. Oftentimes, poor governance manifests itself only after decisions have been made and their outcomes known. We...

This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor...

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover