Consistent with the incentive implication of inside debt, I show that active equity mutual funds invest less in companies whose CEOs are awarded with higher debt-like compensation, whereas corporate bond mutual funds invest more in such companies. This finding persists after accounting for...

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

We develop a unified model of the interactions among investors, fund companies and fund managers. We show that the interplay between a manager's incentives from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and...

We use a binomial model to derive the optimal trading strategy for a hedge fund manager facing different constraints such as the possibility of the fund liquidation and a minimum net-of-fees return to deliver in order to meet investors expectations. Our model enables us to link the optimal...

Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds’ investment horizon, we find that affected funds influence portfolio firms to reduce the pay duration of their executives to incentivize them to also have shorter...