This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the voting premium...

This paper empirically investigates if corporate governance practices affect the resources firms devote to R&D. Two databases - one on governance ratings and the other on R&D intensity - are merged to obtain a multi-country, multi-sector sample of 279 European companies involved in R&D...

This paper studies the impact of external reference values on managerial compensation contracts. We consider the effect of adoption of non-binding pay nfirms on actal remuneration behavior using a unique country example. We find that introduction of pay nfirms changed the reference values for...

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

This study explores the relationship between the daily habits of S&P 500 CEOs and their financial remuneration. Using a mixed-method approach, the research analyzes time allocation across work, sleep, and exercise among 22 CEOs from leading publicly listed U.S. corporations. Regression analysis...

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed...

We investigate whether and how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, we report that socially connected CEOs receive significantly more similar compensation than non-connected CEOs. This...

We examine how chief executive officers' (CEOs) innate risk aversion influences the size and structure of their compensation contracts. In so doing, we estimate managerial risk aversion based on the Big Five personality traits—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and...

The relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is strongly endogenous. In this paper, I use a unique law that sets a binding upper limit on financial firms' executive compensation in Israel as an exogenous shock and study the effect of capping total executive compensation...

A rarely studied trend in corporate governance is the increasing tendency to fill CEO openings through external hires rather than through internal promotions: Kevin J. Murphy and Jaacute;n Zaacute;bojniacute;k (2004) show that the proportion of outside hires has doubled and their pay premium almost...