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The aim of this paper is to examine how family businesses and non-family businesses pay their CEOs differently and the … relationships among family firms, executive pay and corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results show that compare with … non-family businesses, family businesses tend to grant more fixed compensation and less performance-based pay to their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013013682
We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via information disclosure quality. We document a negative association between CEO options and the quality of future managerial disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011963233
Influenced by their compensation plans, CEOs make their own luck through decisions that affect future firm risk. After adopting a relative performance evaluation (RPE) plan, total and idiosyncratic risk are higher, and the correlation between firm and industry performance is lower. The opposite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968863
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We study the market for CEOs of large publicly-traded US firms, analyze new CEOs' prior connections to the hiring firm, and explore how hiring choices are determined. Firms are hiring from a surprisingly small pool of candidates. More than 80% of new CEOs are insiders, defined as current or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546976
We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986527
Between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134769
We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062043
Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107693