A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we …

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core …

the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …

are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite … time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a …

-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …