We study the design of managerial practices for matching workers to divisions. Our methods use both sides' preferences to match with each other, and on the employer's expectations about resulting productivities. Our model derives boundary conditions for when dictating assignments outperforms...

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...

We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all agents' assignments, and agents have privately-known preferences about their own match (but are indifferent about others'). Unhappy agents can quit, but the principal can stop...

We present evidence from a randomized trial of the impact of matching workers to jobs using the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Our setting is the U.S. Army's annual many-to-one marketplace that matches 10,000 officers to units. Officers and jobs are partitioned into over 100 distinct...