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We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318699
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012206686
—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive formulations allow us to reduce often complex models to a sequence of essentially … of the basic theory: the Revelation Principle, formulating and simplifying the incentive constraints, using promised … advanced topics: duality theory and Lagrange multiplier techniques, models with lack of commitment, and martingale methods in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261151
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003925940
We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978605
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493285
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979703
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003576939