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Corruption in public procurement auctions : positive equilibrium analysis, incentive mechanism design, and empirical study

Wihardja, Maria Monica - In: Journal of economic development 35 (2010) 1, pp. 35-57

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003960062

Extortion and political-risk insurance

Koessler, Frédéric; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane - In: Journal of public economics 120 (2014), pp. 144-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492045

Corruption in Public Procurement Auctions : Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, and Empirical Study

Wihardja, Maria Monica - 2009

We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first …-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders … and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720196

Essays in mechanism design

Rosar, Frank - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783373

The influence of mechanisms : essays on non-binding auctions, contact options and feed-in tariffs

Leepa, Claudia - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226487

Three essays on auctions and mechanism design

Hu, Luke - 2014 - 1., Aufl

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246844

Auctioning of CO2 emission allowances in phase 3 of the EU emissions trading scheme

Benz, Eva (contributor); Löschel, Andreas (contributor); … - 2008

The "Climate action and renewable energy package" proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761038

Exploring the limits of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments

Reinhardt, Markus - 2014

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010463078

Auction Theory : Introductory Exercises with Answer Keys

Choi, Pak-Sing; Munoz-Garcia, Felix - 2021 - 1st ed. 2021.

Chapter 1: Second-price auctions -- Chapter 2: First-price auctions -- Chapter 3: First-price auctions, Extensions -- Chapter 4: All-pay auctions and auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders -- Chapter 5: Third-price auctions, kth-price auctions, and lotteries -- Chapter 6: The Revenue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012519940

Approximately optimal mechanism design

Roughgarden, Tim; Talgam-Cohen, Inbal - In: Annual review of economics 11 (2019), pp. 355-381

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623474

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