Extortion and political-risk insurance
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Koessler, Frédéric ; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 120.2014, p. 144-156
|
Subject: | Auctions | Corruption | Expropriation | Extortion | Governance | Harassment | Mechanism design | Political-risk insurance | Korruption | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Versicherung | Insurance | Kriminalität | Crime | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktion | Auction | Enteignung |
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