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Auctions for social lending : a theoretical analysis
Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas - In: Games and economic behavior 86 (2014), pp. 367-391
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304973
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455431
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Selling privacy at auction
Ghosh, Arpita; Roth, Aaron - In: Games and economic behavior 91 (2015), pp. 334-346
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011385836
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 95 (2019), pp. 133-152
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012285713
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Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
Golrezaei, Negin; Nazerzadeh, Hamid - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 1, pp. 130-144
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011648891
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When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions
Carrasco, Vinicius; Orenstein, Paulo; Salgado, Pablo - In: Journal of mathematical economics 62 (2016), pp. 52-61
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011664891
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888