In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive...

New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in...

New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in...

This research paper — a companion piece to Professor Patrick Rey's recent report for the FNE regarding the economics of vertical restraints — considers how the important policy implications of Rey's analysis might be translated into effective enforcement standards. As U.S. Supreme Court...

Information is power. Nowhere is this truer than in regulation; and in telecommunications regulation particularly. For the complexity of the telecommunications systems to be regulated and the rapidly developing technology involved means that, in telecommunications even more than elsewhere,...