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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

Monetary Policy Implications Central Bank Digital Currencies : Perspectives on Jurisdictions with Conventional and Islamic Banking Systems

Lukonga, Inutu - 2023

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) promise many benefits but, if not well designed, they could have undesired consequences, including for monetary policy. Issuing an unremunerated CBDC or a wholesale CBDC does not change the objectives of monetary policy or the operational framework for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014355809

Central Bank Digital Currencies : Motives, Economic Implications and the Research Frontier

Auer, Raphael A.; Frost, Jon; Gambacorta, Leonardo; … - 2021

In only a few years, central banks have rapidly ramped up research and development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). A growing body of economic research is informing central banks’ efforts, often focusing on the “reserves for all” aspect of CBDCs for retail use. However, CBDCs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211960

Permissioned distributed ledgers and the governance of money

Auer, Raphael A.; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song - 2021

We explore the economics and optimal design of "permissioned" distributed ledger technology (DLT) in a credit economy. Designated validators verify transactions and update the ledger at a cost that is derived from a supermajority voting rule, thus giving rise to a public good provision game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432480

Can Central Bank Communication Help to Stabilise Inflation Expectations?

Jung, Alexander; Kühl, Patrick - 2021

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the … visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB … communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227730

Effects of Official and Unofficial Central Bank Communication on the Brazilian Interest Rate Curve

Pereira, Luis Fernando - 2018

In order to provide greater transparency in their opinions and decisions, central banks around the world use both their official channels and the specialized media to communicate with the general public. Using an unique news dataset with intraday frequency, this paper finds evidence that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924507

Does Communication Inﬂuence Executives’ Opinion of Central Bank Policy?

Hwang, In Do - 2020

intensive central bank communication worsens the perceived impact. During the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC), this effect became …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822449

Central Bank Communication and Public Trust : The Case of ECB Speeches

Hwang, In Do; Lustenberger, Thomas; Rossi, Enzo - 2022

Does communication influence trust in the central bank? We examine this question using survey data covering 488 …,000 Eurozone citizens from 1999 to 2019. We find compelling evidence that more communication, as measured by the number of speeches …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082140

The Nash equilibrium in the policy mix model for Czechia, Hungary, and Romania

Stawska, Joanna; Malaczewski, Maciej; Malaczewska, Paulina - In: Cogent economics & finance 9 (2021) 1, pp. 1-14

The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013183737

Money talks

Hoerova, Marie; Monnet, Cyril; Temzelides, Ted - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 617-621

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. When externalities create a wedge between private and social welfare, the central bank has an incentive to misreport its information. Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594064