Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for … accountable.  This paper investigates the effectiveness of an accountability system that combines bottom-up monitoring and top …

- collusive or competitive - increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the …, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the … two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both …

free-riding, which are often ignored in the literature. We derive the optimal monitoring mechanism and show that it solves … “assignment problem,” which, coupled with the need to generate incentive for monitoring, prevents the optimal monitoring mechanism … for the success of monitoring is whether monitors can be penalized for false reporting. Without this assumption monitoring …

of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the …