The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task
Year of publication: |
January 2017
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Authors: | De Chiara, Alessandro ; Livio, Luca |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 133.2017, p. 172-186
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Subject: | Auditing | Collusion | Corruption | Extortion | Monitoring | Supervision | Korruption | Theorie | Theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision |
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