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Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment
Johansson, Per; Lindahl, Erica - 2010
During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social interactions for explaining sickness absence behavior. In this context public discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273934
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Substitution between temporary parental leave and sickness absence
Persson, Malin - 2011
subject to intensified monitoring. Receiving this information decreased utilization of the temporary parental benefit but at …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321128
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Monitoring, liquidity provision and financial crisis risk
Mundaca, B. Gabriela - 2007
This paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on … with discretion and the second in which the optimal monitoring policy rule is made public. The results show that banks … exert less effort and take higher risks with discretionary monitoring policy. With public information about monitoring rules …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284376
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531724
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
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Monitoring, cross subsidies, and universal banking
Choi, Jay Pil; Stefanadis, Christodoulos - 2015
loans. This practice has an adverse effect on commercial banks' monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342362
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The institutional revelation : a comment on Douglas Allen's "The Institutional Revolution"
Mokyr, Joel; Espín-Sánchez, José-Antonio - In: The review of Austrian economics 26 (2013) 4, pp. 375-381
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228546
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Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carli, Francesco - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 105-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549038
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Monitoring, cross subsidies, and universal banking
Choi, Jay Pil; Stefanadis, Christodoulos - In: International journal of industrial organization 43 (2015), pp. 48-55
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488656
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Dynamics of banks' capital accumulation
Barnea, Emanuel; Kim, Moshe - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 46 (2014) 4, pp. 779-816
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010466726