Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
Year of publication: |
September 2015
|
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Authors: | Antinolfi, Gaetano ; Carli, Francesco |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 105-119
|
Subject: | Costly state verification | Default | Monitoring | Dynamic contracts | Moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Anreiz | Incentives | Kreditrisiko | Credit risk | Vertrag | Contract |
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