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We study dynamic moral hazard when the principal can only commit to spot contracts. Principal and agent are ex ante symmetrically uncertain about the difficulty of the job, and update their beliefs on observing output. Since the agent's effort is private, he has an additional incentive to shirk...
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We study dynamic moral hazard with symmetric ex ante uncertainty about the difficulty of the job. The principal and agent update their beliefs about the difficulty as they observe output. Effort is private and the principal can only offer spot contracts. The agent has an additional incentive to...
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