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Nash - Walras equilibria
Ghosal, Sayantan - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000960727
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Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy
Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, Heraklis M. - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001430807
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, Heraklis M. - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001461693
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, Heraklis M. - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001467021
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Nash-Walras equilibria
Ghosal, Sayantan - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 51 (1997) 1, pp. 31-40
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001216268
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, Heraklis M. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 21 (2003) 2/3, pp. 573-584
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001732899
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, Enrico (contributor);  … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001589519
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Information at equilibrium
MINELLI, Enrico; POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000
In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008366
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, Enrico; Polemarchakis, H. - 2001
In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318881
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Information at equilibrium
Minelli, E.; Polemarchakis, H. - In: Economic Theory 21 (2003) 2, pp. 573-584
In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370843