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Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2021

-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our … bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012695303

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Distributional effects in household models: Separate spheres and income pooling

Browning, Martin; Chiappori, Pierre Andre; Lechene, Valérie - 2006

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293065

Pro t-Maximizing Matchmaker

Yu Ko, Chiu; Konishi, Hideo - Boston College / Department of Economics - 2009

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302542

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …-cooperative foundation ; Nash program ; Implementation ; Solution based social choice rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944582

On liability insurance for automobiles

Flåm, Sjur D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965107

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - 2011

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153947

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

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