This book examines a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning. Topics include interactive learning problem …; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and … its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private … signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning … unbounded strength there is learning in a strong sense: agents' actions are ex-post optimal given both the state of the world …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the … are also able to learn structural properties of the games. -- Game Theory ; Learning ; Extrapolation …

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the …