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Maskin's theorem with limited veto power

Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A. - In: Games and economic behavior 55 (2006) 2, pp. 331-339

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003327706

Nash implementation without no-veto power

Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A. - In: Games and economic behavior 64 (2008) 1, pp. 51-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003811591

On combining implementable social choice rules

Benoît, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Remzi - In: Games and economic behavior 60 (2007) 1, pp. 20-30

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003496163

Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A. - In: The review of economic studies 71 (2004) 2, pp. 397-424

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001988975

Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558127

The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A.; Sethi, Rajiv - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000983299

Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts

Koçkesen, Levent (contributor); Ok, Efe A. (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001654943

Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A. - 2002

Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117800