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Incomplete Stable Structures in Symmetric Convex Games

Slikker, Marco; Norde, Henk - 2000

We study the model of link formation that was introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and focus on symmetric convex games with transferable utilities. We show that with at most five players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142629

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

Spatial Oligopolies with Cooperative Distribution

Sandsmark, Maria - 2009

The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155252

Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining

Gomes, Armando R. - 2004

theory yields a unique stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome - the coalitional bargaining value-that has an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2007

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731672

Bilateral Commitment

Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - 2006

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058107

Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; MacLean, Richard P. - 2011

We prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009151901

Convexity, Differential Equations, and Games

Flaam, Sjur Didrik - 2021

Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players' repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization and differential equations, the purpose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320634

On liability insurance for automobiles

Flåm, Sjur D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2010

Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be … links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of … vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965107

Distributional effects in household models: Separate spheres and income pooling

Browning, Martin; Chiappori, Pierre Andre; Lechene, Valérie - 2006

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293065