The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

In this paper we consider a special class of n-person potential games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained and some possible applications are discussed,...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government's fiscal policy and a central bank's monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country...

Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in...

It has long been established in the literature that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of any binary game of strategic complements among a set N of players can be seen as a lattice on the set of all subsets of N under the partial order defined by the set inclusion relation (⊆). If the...

The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame perfect equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games....

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...