Similar Search Results

Believing when credible : talking about future intentions and past actions

Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 4, pp. 867-889

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665408

Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas : experimental evidence

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria - 2011

Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make … equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to … deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737254

Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas : Experimental Evidence

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181717

Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A. - 2002

Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117800

Policy Gradient Methods Find the Nash Equilibrium in N-player General-sum Linear-quadratic Games

Hambly, Ben M.; Xu, Renyuan; Yang, Huining - 2021

We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove convergence of the method we require a certain amount of noise in the system....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217478

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317

Unawareness, beliefs and games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853

Back to the future : economic rationality and maximum entropy prediction

Barde, Sylvain - 2012

An information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to clarify why the maximum entropy methodology is appropriate for predicting the equilibrium state of economic systems. As a first step, object allocation problems, modeled as knapsack problems, are shown to be equivalent to congestion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532152

Friends or strangers? : strategic uncertainty and cooperation across experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

Chierchia, Gabriele; Tufano, Fabio; Coricelli, Giorgio - 2017

It is commonly assumed that friendship should decrease strategic uncertainty in games involving tacit coordination. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and substitutes. We present an experimental study having...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660682

Friends or strangers? : strategic uncertainty and coordination across experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

Chierchia, Gabriele; Tufano, Fabio; Coricelli, Giorgio - 2018

It is commonly assumed that friendship should generally benefit agents' ability to tacitly coordinate with others. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and substitutes. We present an experimental study in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011817934