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The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
This report provides a conceptual foundation for the analysis of international regulatory co-operation (IRC) and its potential benefits through reduced trade costs. Different forms of IRC aiming to reduce specification, conformity assessment and information costs - which can arise from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582094
-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our … bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012695303
is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680
The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895
We use queuing-related behavior as an instrument for assessing the social appeal of alternative cultural norms. Specifically, we study the behavior of rational and sophisticated individuals who stand in a given queue waiting to be served, and who, in order to speed up the process, consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014230
We use queuing-related behavior as an instrument for assessing the social appeal of alternative cultural norms. Specifically, we study the behavior of rational and sophisticated individuals who stand in a given queue waiting to be served, and who, in order to speed up the process, consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019242
We use queuing-related behavior as an instrument for assessing the social appeal of alternative cultural norms. Specifically, we study the behavior of rational and sophisticated individuals who stand in a given queue waiting to be served, and who, in order to speed up the process, consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024577
In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060727