Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
Year of publication: |
2014-01-28
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Authors: | Brink, Rene van den ; Chun, Youngsub ; Ju, Yuan |
Institutions: | Tinbergen Instituut |
Subject: | Queueing problem | minimal transfer rule | maximal transfer rule | Shapley value | bidding mechanism | implementation | Queuing problem |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 14-016/II |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General |
Source: |
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Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
van den Brink, René, (2014)
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Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
Ju, Yuan, (2014)
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Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts
Brink, René van den, (2014)
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Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games
Brink, Rene van den, (2012)
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Balanced Consistency and Balanced Cost Reduction for Sequencing Problems
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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
Brink, Rene van den, (2011)
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