We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

In this paper we study the formation of coalition structures in situations described by a cooperative game. Players … choose independently which coalition they want to join. The payoffs to the players are determined by an allocation rule on … the underlying game and the coalition structure that results from the strategies of the players according to some …

bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition … value; or the nucleolus, for games where only the 'natural coalition' among two 'natural partners' creates significant value …

schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …