We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …

One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting … weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with …

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule …" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It … is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these …

We report results from a laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining with indivisibilities studying the role of … have on bargaining power and identify how subjects' observed behavior systematically deviates from theoretical predictions …' heuristic which equates bargaining power with recognition probabilities to explain these findings …

recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the … equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities. …