majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable … minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum … stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments. …

on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of … countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable … minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …

, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …