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Negotiation involves determining not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005057
We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852563
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488863
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994660
I study an auction model in which the auction is followed by bargaining between bidders. Bidders with multi-unit demand bid for an object and then bargain over additional units. In the presence of post-auction interaction between players, equilibrium bidding strategies are sensitive to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030236
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397620
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial allocation of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014131106
In the past decade, a new selling procedure called “go-shop negotiation” has gained popularity in mergers and acquisitions. With a dynamic mechanism design approach, I fully characterize the target's revenue-maximizing mechanism, and find that it resembles a go-shop negotiation under certain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907719
A classic challenge in contract and property law is unstructured negotiation between two parties with asymmetric information (i.e., each party has different private information) under bilateral monopoly (each party must negotiate with the other to try to reach an agreement), which often leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065272