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Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions
Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - 2016
This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006248
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Fair collective choice rules : their origin and relationship
Nishimura, Yukihiro (contributor) - 2008
; Efficiency ; Equity ; No-Envy … dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003750503
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Chapter Fifteen. Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
Hammond, Peter J. - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 47-151). 2011
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025193
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Chapter 11 Utilitarianism and the theory of justice
Blackorby, Charles; Bossert, Walter; Donaldson, David - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 543-596). 2002
known axiomatizations and, in addition, prove a new characterization result that uses an axiom we call incremental equity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023832
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Voting for compromises: alternative voting methods in polarized societies
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Buckenmaier, Johannes - 2021 - This version: July 2021
methods (Approval Voting and Borda Count) reduce the support for egoistic options and favor equity and efficiency, avoiding … extreme outcomes. Those methods differ in whether they favor equity or efficiency when the latter benefits a majority. Our …'s lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012625507
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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306
In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271
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Robust Ex-Post Pareto Efficiency and Fairness in Random Assignments : Two Impossibility Results
Ramezanian, Rasoul; Feizi, Mehdi - 2022
deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto … efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal … weakening ordinal efficiency to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296832
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The pivotal mechanism revisited : some evidence on group manipulation
Gantner, Anita; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2011
This paper studies the vulnerability of the pivotal mechanism with respect to manipulation by groups. In a lab experiment, groups decide on the implementation of various alternatives, some of which imply opposite interests for the two subgroups. We investigate the occurrence of tacit and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009737525
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Quasitransitive Social Preference : Why Some Very Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - 1999
If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217938
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Strategy-proofness and efficiency with nonquasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2012
strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment on the domain that includes nonquasi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332480