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Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2010

We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344857

Pocketbook voting and social preferences in referenda

Meya, Johannes; Poutvaara, Panu; Schwager, Robert - 2015

-interest, providing strong evidence for pocketbook voting. However, social preferences like altruism, public good considerations and … allows quantifying monetary benefits associated with each ticket. We find that turnout is much higher among students who … benefit a lot from having a ticket, suggesting instrumental voting. In each referendum, a majority votes in line with self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496966

Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda

Meya, Johannes; Poutvaara, Panu; Schwager, Robert - 2017

We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and … strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental … pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657009

Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda

Meya, Johannes; Poutvaara, Panu; Schwager, Robert - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011645032

Voting as communicating : mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

McMurray, Joseph - In: Games and economic behavior 102 (2017), pp. 199-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792127

A case for standard theory?

Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel - 2015

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229

Voter confirmation bias and electoral accountability

Lockwood, Ben - 2015 - First version: 8 February 2015, This version: 7 June 2015

probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation

Biró, Péter; Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548

Incentives dominate selection : chamber-changing legislators are driven by electoral rules and voter preferences

Portmann, Marco; Stadelmann, David; Eichenberger, Reiner - 2019

The role of electoral incentives vs. selection is ideally analyzed in a setting where the same legislators are selected to decide on policies under different electoral rules and where voter preferences on policies can be precisely measured. This is the first paper to look at such a situation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286323

Condorcet meets Ellsberg

Ellis, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 865-895

studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671890

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