This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We …-<I>D</I> inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed Nash implementation with finite mechanisms in separable …

establishes a condition which is both necessary and su¢cient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are …-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments. …

-proofness ; implementation theory …

This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non … works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially … implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation …

study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996a, 1999) in pure exchange economies. Firstly … the strong type, which may provide a behavioral foundation for decentralized implementation of the Walrasian equilibrium … implementation problems of fair allocations …

sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity … property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty. We apply the … implementation concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes, in combination with unanimity …