This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

Feng and Sabarwal (2018) show that there is additional scope to study strategic complements in extensive form games, by investigating in detail the case of two stage, 2x2 games. We show the same for two stage, 2x2 games with strategic substitutes and with strategic heterogeneity. We characterize...

We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games: the Nash set is a nonempty complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best reply...

In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in...

This paper studies a model for cooperative congestion games. There is an array of cooperative games V and a player’s strategy is to choose a subset of the set V. The player gets a certain payoff from each chosen game. The paper demonstrates that if a payoff is the Shapley or the Banzhaf value,...

Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individualsmay perceive it as having been...

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous mechanisms are allowed and agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers, we prove that all efficient allocations are implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms...

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players' preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), our definitions...

This paper proposes that the ambiguity reflected by a set of priors remains unchanged when the set is translated within the probability simplex, i.e. ambiguity is location invariant. This unifies and generalises numerous influential definitions of ambiguity in the literature. Location invariance...

We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies when there is uncertainty about the number of players. Already in the static game, such uncertainty can imply outputs above Nash. For the repeated game, we argue that the uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy, based on a notion of limited depth of...