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Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
Figueroa, Nicolás; Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Review of economic design : RED 15 (2011) 3, pp. 213-243
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267492
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On the informed seller problem : optimal information disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Review of economic design : RED 15 (2011) 1, pp. 1-36
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903399
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On the informed seller problem : optimal information disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505104
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Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs
Correa, José R.; Figueroa, Nicolás; Stier-Moses, … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003822589
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Optimal auction design under non-commitment
Skreta, Basilikē - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 854-890
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549258
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On the Informed Seller Problem : Optimal Information Disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - 2008
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell herobject(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyersiacute;valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him, but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769869