equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences. …

of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash … equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice … functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in …

We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market … but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching, which coincides with efficient matching in this setting, is … core and whether efficient matching is assortative determine the rate of matching, efficient matching, and surplus achieved …

Holocaust Alternative. We finally provide an applications of our result in a pure matching environment …

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

-proofness ; implementation theory …