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A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

Efficiency Effects on Coalition Formation in Contests

Nevrekar, Saish - 2022

approach by assuming certain properties for the winning probability that imply efficiency gains from cooperation in contest … settings. Efficiency gains are said to be generated if any coalition experiences increasing marginal returns with aggregate … generate sufficient efficiency gains, then any equilibrium always consists of two or more coalitions where at least two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669

Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?

Ghosal, Sayantan; Kannika Thampanishvong - 2007

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049846

Disagreement and Authority

Ellingsen, Tore - 2009

Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012721119

Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model

Houba, Harold - 2007

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729091

Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2015

It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707308

Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

Carraro, Carlo - 2012

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues - which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713418

Decentralized Matching with Transfers : Noncooperative and Experimental Analyses

He, Simin - 2020

We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market with transfers (Koopmans and Beckmann,1957; Shapley andShubik,1972; Becker,1973). Some theoretical predictions align with but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834566

Bargaining Order in Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Compliments

Maurya, Amit Kumar - 2018

Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer's preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object ﬁrst or second. For a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909266