Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present all...

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has...

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods.This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy Nash...

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy...

In this paper, we provide a numerical algorithm to calculate all soft-constrained Nash equilibria in a regular scalar indefinite linear-quadratic game. The algorithm is based on the calculation of the eigenstructure of a certain matrix. The analysis follows the lines of the approach taken by...