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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003968996
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003991695
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994120
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010251468
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143463
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Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design : conference paper
Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2013
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339385
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Who benefits from workers with general skills? : Countervailing incentives in labour contracts
Kübler, Dorothea - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 53 (2002) 3, pp. 290-314
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001687574
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Who Benefits from Workers with General Skills? Countervailing Incentives in Labour Contracts
Kübler, Dorothea - 2004
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard the impact of the agent's transferable human capital on incentives is analysed. It is shown that under asymmetric information the employer (principal) prefers a worker (agent) with general skills to a similarly productive worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113686
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Moneycracy
Fedele, Alessandro; Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo - 2013
How do wage and other financial benefits affect the set of candidates for political office? In this theoretical paper, we answer the question by studying self-selection into politics of individuals with heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous motivations. Our predictions are in line with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730987