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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143463
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003967785
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003968996
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003991695
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010251468
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
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Who Benefits from Workers with General Skills? Countervailing Incentives in Labour Contracts
Kübler, Dorothea - 2004
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard the impact of the agent's transferable human capital on incentives is analysed. It is shown that under asymmetric information the employer (principal) prefers a worker (agent) with general skills to a similarly productive worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113686
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Who benefits from workers with general skills? : Countervailing incentives in labour contracts
Kübler, Dorothea - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 53 (2002) 3, pp. 290-314
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001687574
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The Lemons Problem in a labor market with intrinsic motivation : when higher salaries pay worse workers
Barigozzi, Francesca; Burani, Nadia; Raggi, Davide - 2013
We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation for the job offered by firms in the labor market. We first show that, when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated. More interestingly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730993
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Job Assignments Under Moral Hazard : The Peter Principle Revisited
Koch, Alexander K. - 2011
Inefficient job assignments are usually explained with incomplete information about employees' abilities or contractual imperfections. We show that inefficient assignments arise even with full information about employees' types and complete contracts. Our further results provide a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123052