This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to realize a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product...

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are...

In this paper we study the long run evolution of a mixed oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. We consider an evolutionary setting based on payoff-monotone selection dynamics with N-firm matching which captures the endogenous...

One objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear and intuitive, but yet rigorous, description of the topic of strategic managerial incentives under oligopolistic competition. We further discuss the closely related issues of vertical separation where a manufacturer delegates...

A robust result in the literature on strategic incentives pioneered by Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) is that under quantity competition firm owners induce their managers to make aggressive quantity choices in the product market. We revisit this result in a...

The Classical Cournot Model -- Concave Oligopolies -- General Oligopolies -- Modified and Extended Oligopolies -- Oligopolies with Misspecified and Uncertain Price Functions, and Learning -- Overview and Directions for Future Research