Owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) are cast as villains for engaging in “patent hold-up,” i.e., taking advantage of the fact that they negotiate royalties with implementer-licensees that already have made sunk investments in the standard. In contrast to “patent ambush,” patent...

Public policy toward innovation faces a trade-off: Increasing the compensation of successful inventors increases dynamic efficiency by spurring technological progress, but it decreases static efficiency by enlarging a wedge between price and marginal cost. In making this trade-off, public policy...

This paper explains how basic microeconomics can be used to assess lost profits from patent infringement. The main suggested analysis is an adaptation of merger simulation. Observed prices and quantities are combined with estimated demand parameters to calibrate a model of the industry with...

This paper explains how basic microeconomics can be used to assess lost profits from patent infringement. The main suggested analysis is an adaptation of merger simulation. Observed prices and quantities are combined with estimated demand parameters to calibrate a model of the industry with...

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold-up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. A damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law...