We extend Fisher, Peffer, and Sprinkle (2003) to investigate the effectiveness of a budget-based incentive contract to settings with alternate task characteristics. We first replicate their finding: when groups perform a task with an additive production function, a budget-based contract leads to...

Top management faces two key organizational design choices: (1) how much authority to delegate to lower-level managers, and (2) how to design incentive compensation to ensure that these managers do not misuse their discretion. Although theoretical accounting literature has emphasized the joint...

This study uses principal agent analysis to investigate how the principal’s use of performance measures in the agent’s compensation contract are affected by (1) links between performance measures and (2) substitute and complementary characteristics of an agent’s efforts. We show that the...

To address agents' moral hazard over effort, incentive contracts impose risk on the agents. As performance measures become noisier, the conventional agency analysis predicts that principals will reduce the incentive weights assigned to such measures. However, prior empirical results (Prendergast...

We consider a single-principal/multi-agent model to investigate the principal's preferences over delegated contracting. The analysis extends the single-agent/multi-task LEN model in Feltham and Xie (1994) to a multi-agent/multi-task context. We consider full-commitment contracts, i.e., the...

This paper studies two distinct roles that transfer prices play within multinational enterprises operating in two tax jurisdictions. Assuming that the multinational enterprise chooses one transfer price for tax purpose and another for providing incentives to its subsidiary's manager, we analyze...

This paper studies two distinct roles that transfer prices play within multinational enterprises operating in two tax jurisdictions. Assuming that the multinational enterprise chooses one transfer price for tax purpose and another for providing incentives to its subsidiary's manager, we analyze...

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a...

This study empirically investigates the incentive-action-performance chain on cross-sectional plant data in the context of a Just-in-time (JIT) plant manufacturing environment. Incentives in this study are of the soft goal-oriented variety rather than direct compensation. The empirical analysis...

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies with the incentive schemes offered by the owners, then the well-known results of equilibrium incentive scheme (by Fershtman and Judd, 1987, A.E.R.) get modified. In case of...