accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when … competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the … election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher …

accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when … competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the … election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher …

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …

anti-corruption enforcement affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection. We also show that …