Showing 1 - 10 of 18
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325563
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003428200
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002026366
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001483425
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324869
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316863
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507674
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002554814
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498067
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558340