Economists have greatly criticized regulations that impose uniform environmental standards on plants which may differ in terms both of their marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Such a critic ignores however that the implementation of the standards may vary significantly across...

In this paper, we consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly: firms have different production costs, and their pollution characteristics may also be different. We will demonstrate that, in this case, optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property...

We derive corrective tax rules when firms are oligopolists whose production processes generate emissions that add to a stock of pollution that accumulates over time. In our model, firms play dynamic Cournot games among themselves, and the government designs a tax rule that corrects for both the...

The 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act in the US has extended the tools of the Environmental Protection Agency to recover cleanup costs caused by pollution damages from the liable parties. In particular, the banks who finance the firms causing environmental...

The analysis of organizational change and particularly of its impacts on incentives is neither simple nor easy. We consider here four contexts (choosing a level of decentralization, choosing the level of responsibility for pollution damage, choosing a level of technological or organisational...

We derive emission tax rules that take into account (i) the rent-shifting argument, (ii) the need to mitigate transboundary pollution, (iii) correction for restrictive oligopoly output, and (iv) correction for domestic coordination of outputs. We show that trade liberalization does not...

We characterize optimal firm-specific emission tax rates, and optimal firm-specific emission standards, and provide intuitive explanation on differential treatments. We show that there is a unified framework for deriving firm-specific policy measures. When firms are identical, the optimal policy...