We examine the allocation of a limited pool of matching funds to public good projects using Quadratic Funding. In particular, we consider a variation of the Capital Constrained Quadratic Funding (CQF) mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2019) where only funds in the matching pool are...

In this paper I examine some of the properties of the mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2019) for public goods financing, under a limited pool of matching funds. I explore questions to understand under which conditions social efficiency will most likely be compromised, such as for...

We study liquidity provision in fragmented markets. Market makers intermediate heterogeneous order flows, trading off expected spread revenue and inventory costs. Portfolio considerations to diversify inventory risk reveal that market makers have an incentive to siphon certain orders, thus...

This paper presents a model in which fund managers choose between active management and passive management when investors cannot directly observe managers' efforts and skills. In an equilibrium skilled managers actively manage their funds only when skills can add a large value in active...

We study the determinants of asset market fragmentation. We develop a model of market formation with strategic investors that have heterogeneous valuations for an asset. Investors choose a dealer with whom to trade considering their price impact and the liquidity provided by the dealer....

This study examines the Fear of Missing Out (FOMO) sentiment as a motivation for retail investors to own ICOs. In the extant literature, this sentiment is suggested to be a possible factor explaining ICO investing. This study examines this empirically. Using novel OECD survey data on ICO...

We introduce the "local-global" approach for a divisible portfolio, and we perform an equilibrium analysis for two variants of core-selecting auctions. Our main novelty is extending the Nearest-VCG pricing rule in a dynamic two-round setup, mitigating bidders' free-riding incentives and further...

This paper proposes a two-stage sealed-bid model for the execution of blind portfolios. An asset manager auctions a package of securities to a set of brokers who are unaware of the specific details about individual securities. We prove that our mechanism reduces the costs of execution for the...

We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities as flows...